The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has recently published her much anticipated report on strengthening the United Nations (UN) human rights treaty system. The latest in a series of initiatives launched by the UN over the years to improve the beleaguered treaty system, the report contains a series of recommendations aimed at improving the impact of the treaty system on rights-holders and duty-bearers at the national level. The proposals in the report are based on years of extensive consultations with key stakeholders in the treaty body system that were designed to intensify awareness of the current challenges facing the system as well as to stimulate suggestions for reform. This article considers in detail the potential of the High Commissioner's proposals to tackle the problems in the system and their overall feasibility in the current political climate.
Introduction
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) has recently published her much anticipated report on 'Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System'. 1 The UNHCHR Report is the product of a reform initiative spearheaded by the UNHCHR in 2009, aimed at improving the impact of the United Nations (UN) treaty bodies on rights-holders at the national level by 'strengthening their work while fully respecting their independence'.
2 Publication of the UNHCHR Report follows years of extensive consultations with key stakeholders in the treaty body system, including the States Parties, treaty body members, national human rights institutions (NHRIs) and civil society, designed to intensify awareness of the current challenges facing the system as well as stimulating debate and suggestions for reform. While acknowledging the considerable achievements of the treaty body system to date, the UNHCHR Report sets forth a number of detailed proposals and recommendations for reform of the system based on the consultation process to date. This article considers the potential of these proposals to tackle the problems in the system and their overall feasibility in the current political climate. It begins by setting the UNHCHR Report in context by outlining the extent of the problems which the proposals in the Report seeks to address and describing the nature of the consultation process adopted by the High Commissioner.
Background
As is well known, the challenges facing the treaty body system have been escalating for decades and there has been no shortage of creative ideas proffered from within and outside the UN itself on how to address them. 3 Part of the difficulties arising stem from the fact that the treaty system is a de facto one that was in fact never designed to be a 'system', but which rather has evolved informally into one over time. This has occurred through the development of ten human rights treaties, each with dedicated treaty bodies mandated to monitor the implementation by States Parties of the obligations assumed by them on ratification. 4 The shared characteristics of these treaty bodies, in terms of their nature, functions and powers, together with the steadily increasing, occasionally overlapping and sometimes contradictory demands placed on the States Parties, have led to them gradually being conceptualised as a system, in need of reform as a comprehensive whole. While the pressure for reform is longstanding, it has accelerated in recent years due to a number of compelling factors. First, the system itself has seen unprecedented growth in the past eight years alone, with the adoption of some four new treaties with dedicated treaty bodies, resulting in a corresponding expansion in periodic reporting and individual complaint procedures.
5 Second, with the advent of Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in 2006, the rate of treaty ratification has been gathering pace exponentially, 6 thus generating a major increase in the workload of the treaty bodies as well as an increase in the membership of particular treaty bodies. 7 The demands which this expansion places on the The number of ratifications to the six human rights treaties in force in 2000 was 927. By 2012, the total number of ratifications to human rights treaties in force totalled 1,586: see UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 17. 7
Membership of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee), the CMW, the CRPD and the SPT has each increased since their establishment due to specific treaty provisions or amendments requiring an increase in membership: see system, both in terms of the financial and human resources required to service it, 8 can readily be appreciated when one considers that the ranks of treaty body experts alone has swollen to one hundred and seventy-two, compared to just ninety-seven in 2000; 9 while their aggregate meeting time has increased from fifty-one weeks in 2000 to seventy-four weeks in session in 2012. 10 Expansion of the system has in turn greatly enlarged the volume of reporting obligations on the States Parties, 11 leading to increasing volumes of documentation, as well as high levels of non-compliance and late submission of reports. 12 Even taking account of this phenomenon, the gap between submission of State reports and their consideration by the treaty bodies continues to widen, in some cases to manifestly ineffectual proportions. It is estimated, for example, that the average time lag between submission of a State report to the Committee on Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and its consideration is currently between six to seven years, three to four years for the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), while the average time-lag for other treaty bodies is two to three years. 13 The expansion of the system, together with the persistent refusal of the General Assembly to fund it with commensurate resources, has led to a perfect storm whereby the challenges facing the system threaten to overwhelm it and leave it vulnerable to charges of incoherence, 14 ineffectiveness 15 and increasing marginalisation. 16 8 For a detailed breakdown of the resources currently available to support the treaty body system and the gaps arising, see 'Resources in Support of the Human Rights Treaty Body System^Human Rights Programme' , 31 January 2012, available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/ english/bodies/HRTD/NewYorkConsultation2012.htm [last accessed 16 January 2013]. 9 While treaty body members do not receive a salary for their work, the budget necessary to fund their travel and stay at meetings in Geneva and New York apparently accounts for a 'large percentage of the overall costs of the treaty bodies'. The expansion in terms of membership has inevitably affected this budget, which has increased from US$4.3 million in the biennium 2000^2001 to US$12.1 million for the biennium 2010^2011: UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 28. 10 UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 17. The budget for the staff support necessary to service the treaty bodies has increased since 2000 from US$6.1 million in a biennium to US$17.6 billion in a biennium: see ibid. at 27. 11 As noted in the UNHCHR Report, taking account of average reporting periodicities, a State that ratifies the nine core human rights treaties with reporting obligations can expect to submit twenty reports in a time frame of ten years: see ibid. at 21. Shortly after her appointment, the current UNHCHR, Navanethem Pillay, announced her intention in 2009 to tackle this burgeoning crisis by initiating a 'process of reflection on how to streamline and strengthen the treaty body system to achieve better coordination among those mechanisms, as well as in their interaction with Special Procedures and the UPR'.
17 A novel feature of the 'strengthening process' which then ensued and which distinguishes it from previous reform initiatives has been the emphasis placed on advance consultation with key stakeholders in the treaty system. 18 In total, some twenty consultations took place over the course of the following two-and-a-half years involving treaty body members, 19 the States Parties, 20 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 21 and NHRIs, 22 as well as a broader range of entities including academics 23 and other UN actors. 24 The purpose of these consultations was to heighten awareness of the extent of the problems facing the system and to generate ideas on how to address the challenges as well as the role that each of the stakeholders could potentially play in doing so. Thus, while previous initiatives had involved the presentation of ideas to the stakeholders on how to transform the system, the 'strengthening process' relied from the outset on inputs and ideas from the stakeholders themselves and was specifically designed to be an 'open, bottom-up, transparent and participatory' process. 25 The rationale for steering the process of reform in this way stems from the reality that the functioning of the treaty body system and the furthering of its outputs depends to varying degrees on this complex range of actors, each operating with different degrees of involvement, power, expectation and practical experience of the system as it operates as an integrated whole. 26 By conceptualising the reform agenda in this way, the strengthening process clearly reflects a developing consensus that meaningful improvement of the treaty body system and enhancing its impact will only occur with the full involvement of each of the actors that engage with the system and not just the treaty bodies themselves. 
The UNHCHR's Proposals
Taking account of the outputs of the consultation process, the High Commissioner has produced a comprehensive package of proposals on ways and means to strengthen the treaty body system. The stated objective of her report is 'to identify synergies, linkages and areas for mutual reinforcements and potential for future common ground that began to emerge through the consultation process'. 28 The key criteria used in formulating her proposals were that they should respect the treaties and not involve amendments; have been considered by the stakeholders in the consultation process and be capable of generating broad agreement; be mutually compatible and capable of implementation as a coherent whole; and, most importantly, contribute to strengthening the treaty bodies and enhancing the promotion and protection of human rights. 29 The following sections describe the key proposals contained in the report and analyse their feasibility and capacity to effect significant, positive change in the functioning of the treaty body system. 25 UNHCHR Information Note, supra n 13 at 3. 26 The importance and rationale for a fully inclusive, consultative process is reflected in the first consultation of the strengthening process, the 
A. A Comprehensive Reporting Calendar
The most far-reaching recommendation made by the UNHCHR in her Report is that of establishing a comprehensive reporting calendar for those treaties that contain mandatory reporting obligations. 30 This is an idea that has been promoted for many years by NGOs 31 and was formally proposed by the Secretary General to the General Assembly in 2011. 32 It entails organising reporting deadlines into a fixed calendar, based on a five-year cycle and one hundred per cent compliance rate, whereby each State would be expected to submit a maximum of two reports per year, with the constructive dialogue for each submitted report taking place within one year of submission. 33 This would ensure that in any given year, a State could expect to submit no more than two reports and engage in no more than two constructive dialogues on the reports that it had submitted the previous year. 34 The UNHCHR suggests that further refinements to the basic proposal might be implemented whereby the scheduling of each State's reports under the calendar could be synchronised with their deadlines under the UPR process; 35 and reports could be scheduled on a thematic basis, thus ensuring 'maximum commonality' between the reports due each year.
36
Broadly endorsed by NGOs, 37 the basic objective of this proposal is that it would put an end to the haphazard and unpredictable manner in which State reporting is currently managed. Under the present arrangements, the treaty bodies' schedules of meetings are established on the basis of reports received, rather than when they are due for each treaty. This has led to an inequitable situation whereby States that report on time are reviewed more systematically 38 The fixed nature of the calendar proposed by the High Commissioner is thus designed to offset these various problems by providing a clear, predictable and manageable schedule for the States Parties and treaty bodies alike, thus allowing for planning in advance by all of the stakeholders concerned. 39 It might also promote greater systematisation of arrangements at the national level for State reporting by enabling the gradual building up of expertise, ideally through the establishment of a national reporting mechanism. 40 However, while the internal logic of the High Commissioner's proposal is compelling, it entails trade-offs that make its ultimate realisation difficult to envisage in practice. A first factor mitigating potential support is the fixed nature of the calendar, mandating as it does review of a State party's performance under a particular treaty in the absence of a report. While the High Commissioner reasonably argues that immutable deadlines would actually encourage and foster compliance, a number of States in the consultation process expressed serious reservations in principle to the possibility of in absentia reviews, emphasising the incapacity of some States to comply with their reporting obligations. 41 A second factor, noted by the Human Rights Committee (CCPR), in its preliminary statement on the UNHCHR's Report, is the capacity of treaty body members to take on the extra work that would be involved in implementing it. 42 However, by far the most compelling factor undermining its practical implementation is the cost implications that it potentially entails. In this respect, it is estimated that the annual cost of implementing the calendar would amount to US$108 millionçan amount that would represent an increase of approximately US$52 million or doubling of the current budget allocation. 43 The persistent refusal of the States Parties for decades to increase funding to the treaty bodies, together with the concern expressed on this front during the consultation process, 44 suggest that endorsement of the comprehensive reporting calendar by States Parties is profoundly unlikely.
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Perhaps anticipating this result, the UNHCHR Report does set out certain specific, but less preferable, alternatives. These include the implementation of a single, ad-hoc exercise aimed at eliminating the current backlog of reports, by granting the treaty bodies a temporary increase in meeting time necessary to do so. 46 But as the High Commissioner argues, this proposal not only carries its own significant cost implications, but it would also do little to deter the build-up of future backlogs since it would address none of the precipitating factors. 47 A second gambit made in the Report is that in the event of the status quo being maintained, a review should be conducted of the current and projected workload of the treaty bodies in order to establish the staffing requirements necessary to provide the system with an adequate level of support.
48
While the latter is clearly the least ambitious option, holding as it does virtually no potential for progression, few would be surprised to see its endorsement by States over the demands of the first two proposals.
B. A Simplified Reporting and Aligned Reporting Procedure
A significant proportion of the UNHCHR Report on strengthening the treaty body system is devoted to streamlining and harmonisation of the reporting procedure. In a section that envisages a 'simplified and aligned reporting process', the Report includes a range of proposals aimed at improving various stages of the reporting procedureçfrom the submission of State reports, to the operation of the constructive dialogue, through to the production of concluding observations and engagement with civil society, NHRIs and other UN 43 UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 42. The Report (at 42^3) contains a breakdown of this figure by projecting a need for US$79 million for conference services, US$12 million for treaty body members' travel and daily allowances with the remaining amount being required for major increases in OHCHR staffing needs and conference facilities and interpretation facilities. 44 New York Consultation, supra n 20 at para 17. 45 This prediction takes account of further suggestions for reducing the costs of the calendar raised in the consultation process conveyed in the UNHCHR's Report, such as the examination of reports in parallel chambers and reduction in the issuance of summary records: UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 44. 46 This idea was also mooted by the Secretary General in his report on Measures to improve further the effectiveness, harmonisation and reform of the treaty body system: Report of the Secretary-General, supra n 32 at paras 23^6. 47 UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 42. 48 Ibid. at 44.
entities. The demand for greater coordination, harmonisation and rationalising of the reporting procedures was a fairly constant theme in the consultation process 49 and the Report seeks to address these concerns with some fairly direct and specific suggestions as follows:
The Report strongly advocates implementation by all of the treaty bodies and adoption by the States Parties of an optional 'simplified reporting procedure' (SRP). 50 The SRP replicates in substance the List of Issues Prior to Reporting (LOIPR) procedure, first mooted by Philip Alston in his expert report on the treaty bodies in 1993 51 and implemented in recent years by the Committee Against Torture (CAT), CPPR and Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW), while introducing further specificity to its operation and introducing a welcome re-naming of the process. Thus, by electing to report under the optional SRP, a State Party's periodic report under each treaty would consist of a series of answers to an 'SRP questionnaire' compiled by the treaty body in question. It is suggested further that the format for SRP questionnaires should be standardised and consist of a maximum of twenty-five questions and no more than 2500 words. 52 There is little reason to doubt the High Commissioner's contention that adoption of the SRP procedure would entail a number of advantages over the traditional reporting procedure. First, it greatly cuts down on documentation costs and time by eliminating the need for treaty bodies to produce 'lists of issues' after the submission of the traditional report, and for the States Parties to produce written replies to same. The requirement to answer clear, targeted questions tends also to result in shorter, more focused reports. This assessment is borne out by the experience of CAT to date in operating the LOIPR procedure whereby an estimated average saving of over US$13,000 dollars for translation costs has been detected in respect of the reports produced by specific States under the LOIPR procedure, as compared to the costs of translating their previous reports under the traditional reporting procedure. 53 One worrying lacuna in the High Commissioner's presentation of this proposal is its failure to emphasise the importance of eliciting information 49 See, for example, the Marrakech Statement, supra n 22 at paras 16 and 23; Response by Non-Governmental Organisations to the Dublin Statement, supra n 21 at para 26; and Geneva Consultation, supra n 21 at paras 43^50. 50 UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 47^50. Implementation of this proposal can be achieved in the context of the comprehensive reporting calendar or without. 51 See Interim Report, supra n 3 at paras 174^82 and elaborated further in the Final Report, ibid.
at paras 91^3. 52 UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 50. 53 Ibid. at 49. from civil society and NHRIs in compiling SRP questionnaires, 54 especially in view of the concerns raised about access to the LOIPR procedure on the part of civil society in the consultation process. 55 However, provided that attention is paid to this very important element of the process, the High Commissioner's decisive call for systematising the SRP is to be commended for its potential to speed up the reporting process and encourage more focused outcomes. Since support for a simplified procedure appears to be strong amongst NGOs 56 and States, 57 the key challenge in implementing this proposal will be to convince those treaty bodies which have not yet implemented the procedure to do so, rather than to cleave to the traditional procedure by what would appear to be no more than force of habit.
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(ii) Submission of common core documents and regular updates Regardless of whether they choose to adopt the SRP or the traditional procedure, the treaty bodies have already adopted harmonised guidelines on reporting in 2006, which include guidelines on the production of a common core document (CCD). 59 The latter document is aimed at avoiding the duplication of unnecessary information by recording, in a dedicated document, general information on the State and its framework for protecting human rights, as well as information on equality and non-discrimination, and effective remedies. As is well known, the CCD initiative has had a troubled history, reflecting serious objections on the part of some of the treaty bodies to the inclusion of an expanded list of 'congruent provisions' in the guidelines for the CCD. 60 Objections were voiced on the basis that an overly expansive CCD might risk losing the specific focus of particular committees, while others considered that the CCD should be limited to information that was 'broadly stable' and not in need of constant updating. 61 Thus, while the CCD was initially 54 A graph on page 49 suggests that SRP questionnaires should be based largely on previous recommendations to the State Party in the case of a periodic report: ibid. 55 Seoul Statement, supra n 21 at para 5(a); and Response by Non-Governmental Organisations to the Dublin Statement, supra n 21 at 19. 56 NGO Preliminary Response to the UNHCHR Report, supra n 37 at 1. 57 At the Sion consultation, most States expressed broad support for the LOIPR procedure: supra n 20 at 7; see also the New York Consultation, ibid. at para 41. 58 There is clearly some reluctance to do so, as evidenced by a paragraph in the Poznan Statement, promoting the view that the treaty bodies should use LOIPR within a larger 'tool-box' of reporting options, under circumstances that so require: supra n 19 at para 9. 65 During the consultation process, however, a number of positive recommendations were made for the submission and regular updating of the CCD on the basis that it constitutes the 'backbone of the reporting process'. 66 Recognising the potential of the CCD to complement the SRP, 67 as well as the proposal for the comprehensive calendar, by ensuring a more comprehensive, yet focused reporting cycle as a whole, the UNHCHR Report encourages the States Parties to use the SRP in conjunction with the CCD and for the treaty bodies, in turn, to ensure that SRP questionnaires complement the CCD. 68 The Report emphasises the importance, in this respect, of adherence by the States Parties to the harmonised guidelines on reporting and thus clearly stops short of recommending a review of the content of the CCD. However, as the study by Andersen and Devereux has revealed, the 2006 Guidelines contain sparse guidance for States on what to include in the CCD, or how to manage appropriate allocation of information in the CCD and in treaty specific reports. 69 Clearly, this is a complex issue, requiring serious consideration and ideally the development of a CCD questionnaire to complement individual SRP questionnaires. As Johnstone notes, in advocating an expanded CCD, any opening up of this issue would best be managed in the context of a dedicated consultation process involving all of the relevant stakeholders. 64 See the survey by Johnstone, supra n 3 at 72^3. 65 UNHCHR report, supra n 1 at 51. 66 Marrakech Statement, supra n 22 at para 16(b); and Poznan Statement, supra n 19 at para 10.
NGOs appear to be more circumspect about the value of the CCD, advocating instead that the treaty bodies should evaluate whether it is an effective use of resources and whether cheaper ways can be found to produce the information and keep it regularly updated: see Response by Non-Governmental Organisations to the Dublin Statement, supra n 21 at para 18. 67 States have emphasised the value of the CCD in the context of the LOIPR: see New York
Consultation, supra n 20 at para 42. 68 UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 52. 69 Andersen and Devereux, supra n 60 at 94^7. 70 Johnstone, supra n 3 at 74.
(iii) Strict adherence to page limitations Enlargement of the treaty body system over time has had major financial implications in terms of documentation with the high translation costs that this entails. Indeed, the cost of translating treaty body documentation constitutes the highest cost item in operating the treaty bodies. 71 While all States Parties reports are published in the language of submission (which must be one of the six official languages of the UN), 72 on average, the treaty bodies request translation of State reports, responses to lists of issues and information submitted under follow-up procedures into three other official languages. 73 The total cost of formatting, editing, referencing, translating and reproducing just one page of treaty body documentation into three languages is estimated to be US$1,560.
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These costs are compounded by the lack of discipline exhibited by the States Parties to date, in particular, in regard to treaty body documentation. For example, while the Harmonised Guidelines on Reporting produced in 2006 indicate that CCDs should not exceed sixty pages, initial reports should not exceed sixty and periodic reports no more than forty, 75 these Guidelines are routinely flouted as the UNHCHR's Report explains. In 2011, for example, sixty-four per cent of the periodic reports considered by the treaty bodies in respect of one hundred and fifteen reporting States exceeded the forty-page limit specified in the harmonised guidelines. This resulted in an estimated over-spend of US$5.5 million in translation costs, in respect of the 2,992 extra pages submitted.
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The treaty bodies also produce, to varying degrees, a significant volume of documentation that must be translated (including concluding observations, individual communications and often voluminous annual reports), the total cost of which is estimated per year to amount to over US$25 million. 77 In light of these staggering costs, it is not surprising that the High Commissioner has zoned in on this issue as an obvious target for savings. The experience gleaned from the UPR process, where page limitations are strictly 71 UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 24. For an overview of the translations costs involved in regard to treaty body documentation, see 79 To this end, the Report encourages the treaty bodies to remind States systematically in all concluding observations of the need to adhere to the page limitations indicated in the Harmonised Guidelines and to return reports which fail to respect them. 80 Interestingly, the report advocates further specific guidelines in respect of concluding observations, that is, that these should be confined to a maximum of twenty recommendations per 2,500 words and be focused on priority issues. 81 Taken in combination with the recommendation that SRP questionnaires should comprise no more than twenty-five questions per 2,500 words, 82 the aim here is to generate more focused reports, which will in turn encourage more specific and concrete concluding observations.
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(iv) Aligned methodology for the constructive dialogue A central feature of the reporting process and one of its 'outstanding successes' 84 is the constructive dialogue deployed by the treaty bodies in examining State reports. While not strictly speaking mandated by the text of the treaties, the process of clarifying state reports through an interactive dialogue with State representatives, backed up by input from NGOs and NHRIs, is a long-standing and well-established practice of all of the treaty bodies which operate reporting procedures. 85 But while the practice may be common to all, the modalities for its execution vary between them and this variation has clearly been a cause of considerable irritation to the stakeholders over the years. During the consultation process, concern was expressed by the States Parties regarding the conduct of the dialogue, particularly as regards a 78 Under the UPR, State reports are required to be no more than twenty pages, while the compilation of UN information and summary of stakeholders' views, produced by the OHCHR must each adhere to a strict ten page limitation: see there is clearly room for improvement in the harmonisation and better management of the process by the treaty bodies. A recent survey by the OHCHR reveals significant disparities in relation to the length of time dedicated to constructive dialogues (from two to three hour meetings in the case of four committees, to five, eight and nine hours in the case of others). 89 Other differences relate to the conduct of the dialogue. For example, most committees allocate fifteen minutes for opening statements by the States Parties, while the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) allocates a sixty-minute period. 90 Different practices obtain in respect of the method for compiling and posing questions, with some committees asking questions en bloc, Article by Article, while others, like the CPPR and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), deploy task forces to manage this aspect of the process. 91 The treaty bodies themselves have acknowledged the need to enhance the structure of constructive dialogues, but their deliberations on this issue appear to have produced very little in the way of specific suggestions for reform. The twelfth inter-committee meeting of the treaty bodies reached agreement that opening statements should be limited to thirty minutes (with flexibility in extraordinary situations), meeting time should be limited to two meetings of no more than six hours in total for periodic reports and that guidelines should be devised for better management of meetings, taking account of the 'specificities' of particular committees. 92 In her Report, the UNHCHR has honed in on this issue and has made far more precise recommendations, drawn from the best practices of particular committees. She has advocated the adoption of guidelines by the treaty bodies, specifying that the length of constructive dialogues for periodic reports should be 86 See Sion Consultation, supra n 20 at 9^10; see also, Geneva Consultation, ibid. at paras 51^2;
and limited to two meetings of no more than six hours in total and that opening statements be limited to fifteen minutes. 93 Furthermore, the Report recommends that country task forces should be established by all committees (as is the current practice of the CCPR and CEDAW) to prepare for and manage the dialogue, that questioning should be by 'theme' in regard to initial reports and on specific and pressing issues in regard to periodic reports and that interventions should be limited by the use of a speech timer. 94 States Parties are urged in turn to send high-level and well-informed delegations to the meetings and to provide short and precise replies to questions. 95 It is unclear why the Report does not recommend a practice whereby the list of questions to be posed should be sent in advance to the State Party under review, as was urged by many States in the consultation process. Such a practice would surely go some way to speeding up the process and enable States to better prepare for the dialogue. 96 Notwithstanding this one omission, there is no doubt that the recommendations made would go some way to eliminating much of what Bayefsky has termed the 'dysfunctional dimensions' 97 of the constructive dialogue. The real question will be whether the treaty bodies will move to implement them across the board, given their reluctance to innovate from their individual practices or to heed previous recommendations along the same lines.
(v) Focused concluding observations
Consistent with all of the previous recommendations, the UNHCHR Report urges treaty bodies to craft and adopt more focused and targeted concluding observations, containing concrete and achievable recommendations.
99 This is an issue on which virtually all of the participants in the consultation process agreed on the basis that further refinements to this key output of the reporting process would facilitate implementation at the national level. 100 Like the evolution of the constructive dialogue, the very notion of concluding observations on each State report has had an interesting, developmental history.
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Although the idea of commenting on each State report was emphatically 93 UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 57. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Geneva Consultation, supra n 20 at para 51. 97 Bayefsky, supra n 3 at 63. 98 UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 62^3. 99 Ibid. at 60^2. 100 New York Consultation, supra n 20 at para 48; Marrakech Statement, supra n 22 at para 16(c);
and Seoul Statement, supra n 21 at para 7. In contrast to the other groups, participants at the Consultation with UN Entities and Agencies agreed that broad recommendations did give States the flexibility to decide on ways and means to implement them: see supra n 24 at 6. resisted in the early life of the treaty bodies by Eastern bloc countries as potential interference in domestic affairs, the easing of Cold War tensions gradually led to the adoption by each of the treaty bodies of such a practice, albeit that the structure of their concluding observations came in slightly different shapes and sizes. 102 While the going has been slow, progress has been made on harmonising the nomenclature used in the observations and concerns now centre on their length, specificity and structure. In 2010, the average length of concluding observations was six to eight pages, the lengthiest being those of the CRC, which averaged twenty-one pages. 103 As to structure and specificity, NGOs have urged the treaty bodies to formulate 'targeted, specific, measurable, achievable and time-bound' recommendations. 104 It has also been argued that the diplomatic language used in the observations needs to be attenuated, with committees clearly specifying whether a particular treaty norm has been violated. 105 The OHCHR Secretariat has also made very specific suggestions to the treaty bodies for improving the structure of the concluding observations, including the idea of limiting the length of paragraphs and number of sub-paragraphs and prioritising recommendations.
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The Report repeats a number of these suggestions 107 while recommending specifically that the treaty bodies adopt a common format for concluding observations and reduce their length, optimally to six pages (3,500 word count), taking into account the number of substantive provisions and the treaty in question. 108 It suggests that previous observations should be the starting point for the next set of observations and that the recommendations made should include concrete guidance for States in regard to what is needed to implement treaty obligations. Furthermore, the UNHCHR repeats a suggestion made earlier by her to the treaty bodies that the observations should be divided according to immediate and long-term priority issues, based 'on a balance between urgency and the feasibility of addressing the different issues within any given reporting cycle'. 109 Recommendations for structural change should be made systematically, while those of a programmatic nature should include 102 Ibid. at 29^31. 103 See Note on Reporting Modalities, supra n 89 at para 28. 104 Pretoria Statement, supra n 19 at para 9.1. 105 See the Lucerne Consultation, supra n 23 at 6^7. 106 Note on Reporting Modalities, supra n 89 at 34, paras 32, 33 and 35. 107 UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 61^2. 108 In their preliminary response to the UNHCHR's Report, NGOs reiterate their support for precise and focused concluding observations, but register their disagreement with the notion that 'shorter is necessarily better': see NGO preliminary response to the UNHCHR Report, supra n 37 at 1. 109 UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 62. During an earlier meeting with members of the treaty bodies, the UNHCHR had previously acknowledged that prioritisation is a sensitive subject, given the indivisibility of rights and hence that the goal here would be to structure concluding observations around immediate, medium-term and short-term 'deliverables': see Note on Reporting Modalities, supra n 89 at para 36.
indicators by which to measure achievement. 110 If a particular treaty provision or standard has not been respected, the treaty body should specify the Articles in question 'for greater clarity' and finally, cross-referencing of the recommendations of other bodies, the special procedures and the UPR should occur when relevant. 111 The specificity and force of these recommendations demonstrate just how far expectations have changed in regard to concluding observations, since the days when any form of overt adjudication of a State's human rights record was strictly avoided in the reporting process. Like many of the other recommendations aimed predominantly at the treaty bodies, however, their fruition depends entirely on the willingness of the each of those bodies to recognise the value of coherence in the outputs of the collective whole, as opposed to preserving the perceived need for particularity in respect of their individual mandates.
(vi) Further institutionalisation of relations with other UN entities
Writing a decade ago, Clapham recorded how peripheral the work of the UN human rights treaty bodies appeared to be to the realities of human rights work on the ground for UN field operations. 112 Recognising this lacuna, the consultation process included a specific consultation with UN entities and specialised agencies and their voice in the process has generated a number of useful recommendations in the ensuing Report. 113 These include recommendations to the treaty bodies themselves to systematise and align their modes of interaction with UN entities and to develop guidelines to this end; to UN country teamsçto provide coordinated input on States reports, to support States and related stakeholders in fulfilling their respective roles in the reporting process and to support and facilitate the translation and distribution of treaty body outputs, as well as the crucial, follow-up phase.
114 These recommendations are clearly aimed at enhancing system-wide coherence between the treaty bodies and UN entities, and at making the latter a more central player in procedures that are of obvious relevance to their work on the ground. Although the Report is vague as to the costs of implementing these proposals, it is clear that to do so in a meaningful way will require significant investment of time and resources on the part of OHCHR, field presences and UN country teams. (vii) Aligned models of interaction between treaty bodies, NHRIs and civil society
The more activist stance taken by the treaty bodies in fulfilling their reporting functions since the end of the Cold War also finds expression in the increased role accorded to NGOs in those procedures. In this respect, participation by NGOs in the reporting procedures has grown from a point where they had no formal role at all to play in the process to one which has been aptly characterised as a 'critical dependency' of that process. 116 This input takes the form of direct provision of 'shadow' reports to the treaty bodies on the State's performance in implementing the particular treaty in question, through to oral presentations to the treaty bodies of their key concerns in advance of the constructive dialogue. 117 The role played by NGOs in the reporting procedures has also been steadily supplemented in recent years by those of NHRIs, many of which have gradually drawn on the treaty body system as a means to fulfill their vital 'bridging' role between the international human rights system and the national stage. 118 Through the provision of shadow reports and oral presentations, NHRIs have increasingly moved to systematise their interactions with the treaty bodies 119 and the treaty bodies have in turn begun to deepen their engagement with such institutions in the reporting process. 120 An obvious source of frustration for both groups, however, is the lack of coherence and alignment in the modes of engagement deployed by individual treaty bodies in interacting with them. 121 For example, some treaty bodies meet with NGOs in formal, public meetings for stakeholders; others meet with them in private, closed meetings; some employ a combination of both modes of interaction, while still others supplement formal meetings with private, lunch-time briefings.
122 Similar disparities exist vis-a' -vis modes of interaction with NHRIs, with some treaty bodies listening to the views of NHRIs alongside those of NGOs, others meeting with them separately and one giving NGOs speaking rights during the constructive dialogue. 123 Clearly, as the treaty bodies themselves have recognised, that there is much room to harmonise their working practices so as to create a less confusing landscape for these key contributors to the process. To this end, the Report proposes that henceforth, formal meetings between the treaty bodies and NGOs and NHRIs should take place over the course of three hours, during official public meeting time, with two hours being devoted to NGOs and the third hour devoted to NHRIs. Such meetings should be scheduled to take place on the first day of the week in respect of the State reports scheduled for consideration in that week. Additional, private, one-hour, lunchtime meetings may be scheduled by NGOs on the day before consideration of their particular State's report, in which NHRIs 'could also participate'. 124 The potential advantages to this arrangement, as recorded in the Report, are that public meetings are officially recorded, facilitated by interpretation and open to the State Party in question. The supplemental lunchtime briefings could expand the time available for discussion and allow for more 'in-depth' discussion. However, what is perceived as a virtue may also be a vice and in this instance, the automatic pooling of NGOs and NHRIs together in public session, as well as in private, may be problematic as it may stifle the voice of NGOs in such situations as there will be no forum in which they can freely draw matters to the attention of the treaty bodies, without fear of reprisal from the State.
125 This is especially so where the NHRIs in question are not compliant with the Paris Principles or play 'an ambiguous role' on the domestic stage in terms of genuine human rights protection. 126 Furthermore, even where no such concerns arise, unless it is well managed, such an arrangement may also potentially lead to friction between such bodies in vying with each other for precious speaking time. Not surprisingly, this proposal has been received as a lightning rod for NGOs 127 and has been flagged by the CCPR as requiring further discussion with the bodies concerned 'given the distinct nature and functions of non-governmental organisations and NHRIs'.
128 One approach to managing these concerns might be for the treaty bodies to exercise their discretion in regard to the need for private meetings and, in any event, to limit oral participation rights 122 Note on Reporting Modalities, supra n 89 at paras 51^2. 123 Ibid. at para 44. 124 UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 65. 125 The Report specifically alludes to the problem of reprisals against NGOs and proposes measures aimed at averting them, see ibid. at 67. 126 See Rosenblum, 'Tainted Origins and Uncertain Outcomes: Evaluating NHRIs', in Goodman and Pegram, supra n 120 at 297, 307. 127 NGO Preliminary Response to the UNHCHR Report, supra n 37 at 2^3. 128 CPPR Preliminary Statement on the UNHCHR Report, supra n 42 at para 3.
to NHRIs which have been accorded ' A'status by the International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs. This approach would be consistent with that taken by the Human Rights Council where only ' A' status institutions have speaking rights before that body, whereas 'B' status institutions are afforded observer status only and 'C' status institutions are accorded no rights or privileges at all. In operating such a criterion, however, the treaty bodies would need to apply some measure of flexibility, given the difficulties faced by some well-functioning, thematic human rights institutions and classical ombudsman in complying with the Paris Principles.
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C. Strengthening the Individual Communications Procedure
Of all the recommendations made in the UNHCHR's Report, perhaps the most radical and surprising relates to the operation of treaty body individual communications procedures. In this respect, the Report recommends that the treaty bodies 'pronounce themselves' on a proposal generated during the consultation process by CERD for the creation of a joint, treaty body working group on communications, to be composed of experts from each of the treaty bodies.
130 CERD's proposal is a diminution of a suggestion made earlier by it in response to the former High Commissioner's proposal for a unified standing treaty body (USTB) for the processing of individual complaints. 131 Recognising that the latter proposal would entail amendment of the treaties which may not be 'opportune' at the current time, the new proposal moots the establishment of a working group which could discuss individual cases and make recommendations for the adoption by the appropriate committees during their plenary meetings. The UNHCHR Report appears to broadly welcome this proposal, taking the view that it would not require treaty amendment and would add value to existing arrangements by contributing to the development of consistent standards and jurisprudence among the treaty bodies; reinforce the justiciability and interdependence of rights; ensure more coherent outputs given the participation of experts with a broad range of expertise; and contribute to alignment of working methods as between the various committees that deal with communications.
132
The surprising element of this proposal is that it undoubtedly sails close to the wind of the former USTB initiative, albeit in the specific context of individual communications. Clearly, the notion of a preliminary working group, mandated to make recommendations to each of the treaty bodies in respect of particular complaints, is a less muscular prospect than that of a unified body with competence to make decisions on the cases themselves. However, beyond the very vague and general statements made in the Report regarding the 'added value'of this initiative, there is virtually no attempt to elucidate the substantive merits of this proposal or any rationale as to how it would make the complaints procedures more effective in practiceça weakness that was considered to be crucial to the failure of the USTB initiative. Furthermore, it is by no means clear that such an arrangement could validly be achieved on an informal basis as each treaty/protocol only gives competence to members of its own designated treaty body to receive and consider the substance of individual communications from States which have agreed to be bound by the complaint procedure in question. Indeed, this point would appear to be the basis for the 'unease' which the CCPR has expressed regarding this proposal. 133 Although an expert consultation of treaty body members on complaint procedures did agree that the possibilities for forming such a working group needed to be further explored, one member of the group apparently questioned the wisdom of harking back to a proposal previously rejected by the States parties. 134 The preference expressed by that member for inter-committee meetings on substantive issues as opposed to specific cases is certainly more persuasive, though its full merits would need to be fully explored and tested in practice.
Beyond the latter proposal, the Report does make further, more predictable recommendations regarding the enhancement of the complaint procedures. These include a proposal for the treaty bodies to prepare guidelines on common procedures for all of the treaty bodies with complaint procedures and for inquiries. 135 Ideally, as suggested by many of the consultees, 136 the guidelines on complaint procedures should include a direction that in all final views and recommendations, clear and specific guidance should be given to States on the remedies that must be afforded to the particular victim as well as on the measures necessary to ensure structural change in the State to guard against similar violations in the future. 137 Further elements should include guidelines on mutual cross-referencing, standardised deadlines, working methods on admissibility, interim measures and protection measures. 138 The
Report also endorses the resounding support shown in the consultations for the creation by the OHCHR of an up-to-date and well-functioning database on individual complaints, aimed at increasing the visibility of and accessibility to the complaint procedures.
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Finally, the Report alludes to the possibility made explicit only in the OP-ICESCR and the OP-CRC for the parties to an individual complaint to achieve a friendly settlement of the dispute with the assistance of the treaty body in question. 140 Recognising that complaint procedures are normally suspended by the other treaty bodies where the parties are attempting to achieve a settlement of the matter, the Report urges the treaty bodies to make themselves available to assist in such settlements and to devise rules of procedures to that end. 141 The CCPR, for its part, has expressed cautious interest in this proposal, noting the need for it to take account of the specificities of complaints procedures, their non-binding nature, the inequality of arms between States and individuals as well as the question of the proper role to be played by the treaty bodies in this respect. 142 Accepting these observations, the proposal nonetheless appears to be a sensible and practical one. Even though the terms of earlier instruments do not specifically provide for this activity, it appears to be consistent with the mandates of the treaty bodies under the complaint procedures and, more importantly, is unlikely to encounter significant political opposition given the explicit adoption of such procedures in the newer complaint procedures.
D. Strengthening the Independence and Expertise of Treaty Body Members
The quality of treaty body membership was a fairly dominant theme in the consultation process, with States Parties, in particular, regarding membership as a 'key element' in strengthening the treaty body system. 143 The treaties provide minimal guidance on the necessary attributes for treaty body membership, requiring usually that members be of high moral character, recognised competence in the relevant field and serve in their personal capacity. Some treaties specify that consideration be given in the election process to persons with legal experience, 144 while more recent instruments allude to the need for 'balanced gender representation' 145 and in the case of the CRPD for membership to include persons with disabilities. 146 However, from the outset, concerns have been raised regarding the high proportion of serving diplomats on the treaty bodies, lack of gender balance and lack of representation by persons with civil society backgrounds. 147 Recent statistics bear out these concerns, indicating that eighteen per cent of the current cohort of treaty members is comprised of serving diplomats or government officials, only nine per cent have civil society backgrounds, while men outnumber women by a ratio of almost two to one. 148 In terms of concrete suggestions to improve the quality and expertise of treaty body membership, the UNHCHR's Report makes a range of related recommendations. First, it takes up the persistent suggestion made in the consultations that States adopt an open and transparent selection process, aimed at ensuring the selection of suitably qualified personnel who are willing to take on the full range of responsibilities required of membership. Second, the Report recommends, rather timidly, that the nomination or election of persons holding positions in government or any other positions that might expose them to pressure or conflicts of interests or generate a negative profile for the individual's own credibility or that of the treaty system as a whole should be avoided. 149 Recognising that the implementation of these recommendations lies entirely within the power of States, the Report makes an innovative proposal, which, if taken up, could strengthen the hand of civil society actors and NHRIs to monitor the election of treaty body members, thus generating pressure for the nomination of suitable candidates. This involves the creation by OHCHR of an 'open space', through the use of modern technologies, where States could present their potential candidates for nomination to the treaty bodies, under conditions to be moderated by five former treaty body members. By enhancing the quality of information available regarding potential candidates, the aim of this proposal is to ensure a more transparent election process with better quality candidates. 150 Not surprisingly, these proposals have been warmly endorsed by the NGO sector.
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The treaty bodies, for their part, have long since been energised by concerns over their perceived independence.
152 Prompted partly by the consultation process, 153 the Chairpersons have recently endorsed a set of self-regulatory guidelines on independence and impartiality of members ('the Addis Ababa' Guidelines') and have urged that the Guidelines be promptly adopted by each of the treaty bodies through their individual rules of procedure. 154 The
Guidelines set out guiding principles and obligations of conduct for treaty body members, which are aimed at eliminating real or perceived conflicts of interest in the performance of their functions, in their relations with States and in their participation in any other human rights activities. 155 The UNHCHR Report also encourages the adoption of the Guidelines, which are clearly a positive step in providing objective guidance to members and forging peer-pressure amongst themselves in matters of impartiality and independence. They should also go some way to scotching the idea raised by some States during the consultations for a 'code of conduct' to be drafted by the States Parties themselves for treaty body members, similar to that which has been adopted in respect of the special procedures mandate holders. 156 Finally, the Report promises to put into effect an idea generated by treaty body members in the Poznan Statement 157 for the development of a Handbook and dedicated webpage by the OHCHR on the expectations, required availability and workloads of treaty body members, the aim of which will be to ensure up-to-date information for all stakeholders on vacancies arising as well as appraising potential candidates of the level of commitment required of treaty body members. 
E. Strengthening the Capacity of States to Implement the Treaties
Recent studies reveal a clear deficit in implementation rates of treaty body recommendations, 159 thus generating an obvious need to focus on ways and means of improving this disappointing reality. Improving the process by which recommendations are arrived at is somewhat meaningless where the recommendations fail to attract compliance on the ground. The UNHCHR Report groups together a number of areas identified in the consultation process that need to be tackled in order to encourage implementation. However, as will be seen, this section of the Report is, to some extent, disappointing in regard to the narrow focus of the proposals and the recipients thereto.
(i) Follow-up of treaty body recommendations An obvious starting point for proposals on intensifying implementation rates is that of measures and procedures being taken to follow-up on treaty body recommendations. A perusal of the documents that emerged from the strengthening consultations reveals that there was no shortage of innovative ideas on how to enhance strategies for follow-up by the treaty bodies themselves of their recommendations. These included ideas for the systematisation of better coordinated and more inclusive follow-up procedures;
160 the development of a specific, inter-committee 'treaty body follow up mechanism' for all treaty bodies 161 or the establishment of a dedicated unit on follow-up or senior level 'Treaty Body Follow Up Coordinator' post within OHCHR. 162 Treaty bodies were also urged to develop indicators to monitor implementation and to conduct studies, in conjunction with OHCHR, to identify obstacles to implementation. 163 The notion of follow-up visits to monitor implementation has also been advanced repeatedly. 164 While it seems clear that a combination of these various ideas would undoubtedly enhance the rather bare-bones follow-up procedures currently operated by many of the treaty bodies, it is equally clear that the current resourcing of the treaty body system makes it almost impossible to envisage their adoption in practice, involving as they would a significant injection of human and financial capital.
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Conscious perhaps of this reality, the UNHCHR Report takes a minimalist position in regard to the strengthening of treaty body follow-up procedures. 166 While it firstly contends that the adoption of the comprehensive calendar would reduce the need for treaty body, follow-up procedures (ensuring as it would a fairly constant review of compliance by States' with their treaty obligations), the report goes on to argue in the alternative, that the treaty body follow-up procedures should be simplified and aligned, both for concluding observations and individual communications. 167 Currently, four of the treaty bodies operate formal, follow-up procedures, in the context of State reporting which variously involve requesting States Parties to provide a written report on efforts made to implement recommendations made in the concluding observations within one or two years of their adoption. 168 All of the five treaty bodies that operate individual complaint mechanisms have adopted follow-up procedures, though these again are subject to variation in terms of the level of information demanded of States and the timelines involved. 169 The UNHCHR Report argues that the treaty bodies should adopt common guidelines for these procedures, and take joint actions for implementing recommendations, including engaging UN country teams, issuing joint press statements and making joint efforts to urge the adoption of enabling legislation by the States Parties.
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While these may be weak and unimaginative proposals, compared to the gamut of stronger ones put forward in the consultation process, they perhaps signify an appreciation of the reality that, in a context of scarce resources, it 164 Poznan Statement, supra n 19 at 28; Dublin II Outcome Document, ibid. at para 110; Seoul Statement, supra n 21 at para 10(d); and NGO Statement on Individual Communications, ibid at para 3.1(e). 165 The Dublin II Outcome Document recognises that the OHCHR does not have the human and financial resources to conduct regular follow-up activities, supra n 19 at para 104. This point was also made during the Consultations on TB Strengthening: Expert Meeting on Petitions, ibid. at 2. 166 This fact is specifically noted by the CCPR in its preliminary statement on the UNHCHR Report: supra n 42 at para 10. 167 UNHCHR Report, supra n 1 at 80. is simply unrealistic to expect the treaty bodies to perform a comprehensive, follow-up role. Follow-up is obviously an extremely important activity for the treaty bodies in terms of measuring the effects of their respective performances, but it is becoming increasingly obvious that other actors and institutions have an extremely valuable role to play in this endeavour on the national and international stage. 171 Recognising this fact, the Report goes on to recommend that the States Parties should move to establish or reinforce what it terms 'standing national reporting and coordination mechanisms' (SNRCM), which should have a dedicated role to play in guiding and monitoring the process of implementing treaty body recommendations as well as coordinating and preparing their periodic reports. 172 Reflecting the notion of 'national frameworks' mooted during the consultation process, 173 the SNRCM envisaged by the UNHCHR should be designed to lead consultations with NHRIs and NGOs on reporting and implementation; identify the relevant actors involved in implementation and guide them through the process; liaise with members of the judiciary to inform them of treaty body recommendations; and collect and disseminate judicial decisions relevant to international human rights law. 174 178 as advocated in the Report) would greatly strengthen the capacity of States to implement the treaties by providing a central axis at the national level for following up on the outputs of the treaty bodies.
Where the Report arguably disappoints is in its failure to expand further on the range of other initiatives that might be taken to improve implementation of treaty body recommendations. One of the strengths of the consultation process was the willingness, first signalled by treaty body members in the Dublin Statement and reinforced in other consultations, to conceptualise reform of the system as a multi-faceted and dynamic process, involving not just the treaty bodies and the States Parties, but also NHRIs and NGOs. 179 In regard to follow-up, it is widely recognised that properly resourced and independent NHRIs are well placed to play a crucial role in this endeavour, by raising awareness of treaty body outputs, dialoguing with government departments and liaising with treaty bodies in the matter of implementation. 180 During the consultation process, NHRIs committed to publicising and disseminating treaty body outputs, organising training activities and keeping under review State Parties' implementation of their obligations under the conventions. 181 NGOs also perform vitally important follow-up activities 182 and made similar commitments during the consultation process to raise awareness of the work of the treaty bodies by disseminating their recommendations.
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While reference is made to the consultative role that such bodies may play with the mooted SNRCM, the Report could have reinforced these commitments by addressing recommendations specifically to these actors in the matter of follow-up. Furthermore, follow-up is definitely an area where synergies with the UPR can be exploited and one might have expected this issue to feature more prominently in this section of the Report, with a specific recommendation for information on non-implementation of treaty body outputs to be systematically included in the UPR compilation documents. 184 Reference is made to the possibility of the treaty bodies making suggestions to special procedures mandate holders to conduct country visits to a State Party which is experiencing difficulties or is persistently failing to implement treaty body recommendations, 185 but again surprisingly little attention is paid to ways and means of forging stronger links between the treaty bodies and the Special Procedures to this end. In short, while valuable suggestions are made in this section of the Report for strengthening the capacity of States to implement the treaties, it could certainly have gone further by conceptualising follow-up measures dynamically as requiring a 'multi-tiered' approach, 186 ideally involving a multiplicity of responses beyond those operated by the treaty bodies, the States Parties and UN capacity building initiatives.
(ii) General comments Apart from follow-up measures, the UNHCHR's Report highlights the development by the treaty bodies of general comments as making an important contribution to assisting compliance by States with their treaty obligations.
187 This is definitely an area in which calls for 'efficiency' have sometimes eclipsed the goal of effectiveness in the consultation process. For example, some States argued that the treaty bodies should abandon the practice of adopting general comments altogether and focus exclusively on examining reports and individual communications. 188 The UNHCHR Report provides a persuasive rationale for the continued adoption of general comments. By fleshing out in more detail the obligations owed by States under the treaties, the Report maintains that general comments contribute to a greater understanding of those commitments thereby facilitating greater compliance. 189 Their utility has also been defended on efficiency grounds on the basis that they can in fact save time by providing guidance in deciding cases and in formulating concluding observations. 190 The Report identifies room for improvement, however, in the processes by which general comments are arrived at, recommending the adoption by all of the treaty bodies of an aligned process of consultation with the States Parties, UN entities, NHRIs and NGOs during the elaboration of such comments. This should include requests to provide written submissions and/or participation in the days of general discussion devoted to the particular issue under consideration. 191 Submissions made by other actors should also be made accessible on the treaty body websites. 192 This recommendation responds to the demands frequently made of the treaty bodies to adopt more transparent decision-making processes in regard to the topics chosen and the elaboration of general comments, taking into account the views of other actors in the process. 193 Interestingly, the Report stops short of recommending the adoption of joint general comments by the treaty bodies on thematic issues, as had been advocated in some quarters during the consultation process. 194 
F. Enhancing the Visibility and Accessibility of the Treaty Bodies
The final batch of recommendations made in the UNHCHR Report advocates increasing accessibility to and heightening the visibility of the treaty bodies through the use of modern technologies, such as webcasting and video-conferencing and augmenting dissemination of treaty body outputs through improved UN databases, social media and national, regional and media outlets. 195 The experience of webcasting in the context of UPR has generated persuasive arguments for its deployment in treaty body sessions as a tool to increase publicity for the work of the treaty bodies, to support training and generally as a means of demystifying the process. 196 Webcasting of treaty body sessions would also provide a counter-balance to the sometimes distorted impression that can be transmitted of a State's human rights record generated through the UPR process. 197 While the value of face-to-face dialogue cannot be gainsaid, the allied technique of videoconferencing undoubtedly provides a vehicle for increasing participation in treaty body sessions for all stakeholders. 198 All of the stakeholders involved in the consultations have expressed broad support for increasing the use of these technologies in the context of the treaty body system, 199 though there appears to be some prevarication by the States parties on the basis of costs. 200 In this regard, the Report acknowledges the cost implications of rolling them out in the UN buildings used by the treaty bodies in Geneva, but argues that webcasting could generate cost-savings opportunities in the long run by replacing the current costly exercise of producing summary records of meetings, while video-conferencing can also save money by reducing travel expenses. 201 These are compelling arguments and it seems only a matter of time before the usage of these techniques is sanctioned at least on a pilot basis. Similarly, while the Report underscores the willingness of the OHCHR to improve the treaty bodies' database and disseminate outputs through a variety of means, it makes it clear that such activities depend completely on the allocation of necessary resources by the States parties. As noted previously, one of the distinguishing features of the 'strengthening process' that has marked it out from previous reform efforts has been the elicitation of stakeholder views. This approach, combined with the assumption of leadership by the UNHCHR and her office in exploring ways of improving the system, are recognised elements of transformation methodologies commonly used across a range of entities from businesses, hospitals to government bodies and agencies. 203 Their deployment by the UNHCHR in the context of treaty body reform, however, clearly served to irritate the sensibilities of a number of States during the consultation process. A summary of the Geneva consultation of the States Parties on treaty body strengthening records the view of several States that there was a need for a 'leading role of States Parties in the process'; that States should not be conceptualised as being on a par with civil society or NHRIs and that ultimately the outcome of the process would rely on States to be 'legally valid and meaningful'. 204 Taking the lead on this perspective, the representative of the Russian Federation tabled a resolution before the General Assembly in February 2012, aimed at establishing an open-ended intergovernmental forum to conduct negotiations on ways of strengthening the treaty body system. 205 As the ISHR has noted, initial indications were ominous as to the inclusivity of this process: the first draft of the resolution apparently made no reference to the High Commissioner's strengthening process and, even though the final draft promised to take account of her Report, the text clearly sought to marginalise its importance and that of other stakeholder input, promising to take account of the latter on an informal basis only. 206 Although the Resolution was less than enthusiastically endorsed by a considerable number of States, its ultimate adoption signalled focused concluding observations could be addressed in the short term, while others wished not to focus on specific issues, preferring instead to discuss all issues 'on an equal footing' and to come up with a final comprehensive agreement. 213 A cohort of hard line States, known as the 'cross-regional group' 214 has been pushing a specific agenda, apparently aimed at diminishing the authority of the treaty bodies and their members by continuing to advocate for a code of conduct similar to that which has been imposed on the Special Procedures mandate holders and greater transparency in the interfacing between the treaty bodies and NGOs. 215 At the request of the co-facilitators, the General Assembly has voted to extend the intergovernmental process until its 67th session, effectively providing for the continuation of negotiations through to an unspecified time in 2013. 216 In the meantime, on a more positive note, the Chairpersons of the treaty bodies have welcomed the broad thrust of the proposals in the UNHCHR Report and have recommended that each committee should carefully review those recommendations addressed to the treaty bodies with a view to potentially implementing them in coordination with other treaty bodies. 217 Indeed, despite objections from some of the States Parties, the OHCHR appears to be suitably determined to encourage this process on the part of the treaty bodies, 218 notwithstanding the evasiveness that appears to be defining the inter-governmental process.
Conclusion
The product of a sustained and well-executed consultation process, the UNHCHR Report makes a number of concrete and practical suggestions that, if implemented, would undoubtedly increase the efficacy of the UN human rights treaty system. These include proposals for a simplified reporting procedure, alignment of the working methods of the treaty bodies, enhancing the expertise and independence of the treaty body members, improving access to the system and raising its profile in general. Although part of a multistakeholder process, the recommendations made in the Report are aimed chiefly at the 'two-key decision makers'çthe States Parties and the treaty bodies. 219 Many of those targeted at the treaty bodies (concerning harmonisation and alignment of working methods) are constructive, specific and cost-free and will require mainly a change of mindset to implement. Some of the more ambitious proposals, however, (such as the comprehensive reporting calendar) would require such significant political will from the States Parties and a corresponding injection of financial resources as to make it difficult to envisage their immediate adoption in practice. With commitments already made by NGOs and NHRIs in the consultation process, the ball is now firmly in the court of the States Parties and the treaty bodies to engage meaningfully with the recommendations made in the Report and to take decisions on them. Otherwise, it may end up being consigned to the history books as yet another valiant attempt to galvanise an increasingly ineffective, but worthy, system crying out for repair.
